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ABSTRACT
In the last decades, European countries have experienced two
relevant waves of immigration. These ‘immigration shocks’ have
contributed to increase dramatically public attention on
immigration issues but also to structure political competition on
both the supply and the demand side of democratic
representation. While immigration issue has been traditionally
conceived as a positional issue, the consensus among voters and
the policy convergence of mainstream parties seem to resemble
Stokes’ model and competition is on a valence issue instead of
position issue. Therefore, the present paper analyses whether and
to what extent voters punish incumbents for high levels of
immigration. Using data from the European Election Study, the
analysis confirms that while voters perceiving high levels of
immigration punish incumbents, performance voting depends on
individual-level attributes such as partisanship and salience, but
also country-level factors like the government clarity of
responsibility. Finally, immigration performance voting is not
moderated by issue ownership. However, the perceived
competence of parties to manage immigration reveals a direct







A basic feature of a quality democracy is the principle that citizens hold the government
accountable for its performance. An extensive literature has traditionally analysed electoral
accountability through the lens of economic voting theory, showing that voters evaluate
national economic conditions, punishing poor and rewarding good performance (Duch &
Stevenson, 2008). Recent research has enlarged the scope of the performance voting
theory to other policy or non-policy related factors (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Clarke
et al., 2009; Ecker et al., 2015; Fumarola, 2018; Singer, 2011; Stokes, 1992). This research
belongs to the wider valence framework elaborated by Donald Stokes (1963) who theo-
rizes the existence of a principal-agent linkage in which voters act as the principal evalu-
ating governments on the basis of their ability to achieve shared and desired policy
outcomes. In the last decade, the traditional valence issue agenda that structured party
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competition in Europe for fifty years has been reshaped to include even issues other than
economy, including crime, immigration and terrorism (Clarke et al., 2009, p. 309). This
paper aims to provide a contribution in this regard, relying on the idea that positional
and valence issues are different but not permanent and separated dimensions. Therefore,
the nature of specific issues depends on contingent factors that bring them nearer to the
positional or the valence side of a continuum (De Sio & Weber, 2014; Green & Jennings,
2017). The present article focuses on immigration and its adaptation to the analytical fra-
mework of the performance voting literature.
In recent years, European countries have experienced two relevant waves of immigra-
tion; a first one driven by the EU enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European
neighbours; a second one represented by the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers,
especially from unstable and poorer regions of the African continent (Grande et al.,
2019). These ‘immigration shocks’ have contributed to dramatically increase public atten-
tion on immigration issues but also to structure political competition (Alonso & Fonseca,
2011; Grande et al., 2019; Van der Brug et al., 2015). Studies on the politicization of immi-
gration in Europe find evidence of the impact the electoral success of radical right parties
has had on both the supply and the demand side of democratic representation. On the
one hand, mainstream parties react by changing their strategy, sharpening their position
on the issue to form coalition governments to exclude radical right parties from govern-
ment or to give them ‘a share of the spoils of office, possibly as a full-blown coalition
partner or else as some kind of support party’ (Alonso & Fonseca, 2011; Odmalm & Bale,
2015, p. 366; cf. van Spanje, 2010). On the other hand research reveals that the electoral
success of the radical right and the increased politicization of the issue, has an impact
on people’s attitudes towards immigration (Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015; Semyonov
et al., 2006; Sprague-Jones, 2011). While the immigration issue is ideologically loaded,
the consensus among voters and the policy convergence of mainstream parties seem
to resemble Stokes’model ‘wherein competition is on a valence issue instead of a position
issue’ (Green, 2007, p. 630).
In this scenario, citizens might be motivated to make vote choices based on their
perceived level of immigration in the country. Therefore, the article analyses the electoral
consequences of retrospective evaluations of immigration using the reward-and-punish-
ment framework. Recent research on issue voting suggests, in fact, the partial assimilation
of immigration to the valence issue agenda (Abou-Chadi, 2016; Alonso & Fonseca, 2011;
Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015; Odmalm & Bale, 2015). As a consequence, voters would evalu-
ate parties on the basis of their ability to achieve a generally desired policy goal, i.e.
they are expected to support governing parties for lower levels of immigration and
punish them for higher levels. Moreover, following the established literature on retrospec-
tive voting, the article tests the conditional effect of individual and country-level
factors. Finally, the potential role of a second valence dimension, namely issue ownership
(Petrocik, 1996) is tested.
I employ survey data from the 7th round of the European Election Study (EES) to analyse
immigration performance voting in 27 European Union (EU) Member States. Results point
out some similarities with traditional studies on performance voting but also some
peculiarities. Retrospective evaluations of immigration performance turn out to be a
strong determinant of voting behaviour in the EU, especially for non-partisan voters. More-
over, analysis reveals how the strength of immigration performance voting is context-
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dependent, i.e. depends on the extent to which institutional settings allow voters to assign
responsibility to policymakers. Finally, while the accountability effect is stronger for voters
considering immigration a salient issue, the perceived competence of incumbent govern-
ment shows only an independent – maybe simultaneous – effect on incumbent vote
intention rather than the hypothesized conditional effect on performance voting. Consid-
ering the growing level of politicization of this issue, studying immigration in the EU rep-
resents not only a contribution to the literature on performance voting but also to the
study of voting behaviour in comparative perspective.
2. Immigration performance voting: a (Quasi-)Valence model
Within EU member states, immigration has gradually become a ‘hot topic’ since the
beginning of the 1990s (Akkerman, 2015; Boswell, 2003; Green-Pedersen & Otjes,
2017). Election campaigns as well as governments’ policy agendas are increasingly
influenced by debates on this issue. In recent years, a large body or research has
shown how electoral competition on immigration has been deeply reshaped by the
combined action of exogenous and endogenous factors (Abou-Chadi, 2016; Grande
et al., 2019; Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015; Mudde, 2004; van Spanje, 2010). On the one
hand, the dramatic increase in immigration happened in the last decades, and later
magnified by the 2008 economic and 2015 migration crisis, has increased the perceived
(economic and cultural) costs of integration while the increased media attention has
greatly contributed to the politicization of the issue. On the other hand, European
countries have experienced the dramatic rise of, in some cases, strong radical right
populist parties that have successfully exploited these challenges to boost their consen-
sus (Hooghe & Marks, 2018). The joint effect of these contingent factors has radically
influenced both the supply and demand side of the chain of representation, i.e. main-
stream parties and voters.
The growing politicization of the immigration issue in Europe since the 1990s, has
inevitably challenged the mainstream parties, both on the left and on the right of the
political spectrum. The pressure exerted by the combined effect of exogenous and
endogenous factors has pushed other parties to adapt their policy programmes and
mobilization strategies, with a progressive sharpening of stances on the immigration
issue and generalized convergence towards more restrictive policies (Givens &
Luedtke, 2005; Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015). The literature on party competition and
immigration provides consistent evidence regarding mainstream left and right parties’
convergence due to the growing salience of the issue and the rise of challenger niche
parties. In their comparative study on ten EU countries, Alonso and Fonseca (2011)
use data from the Comparative Manifesto Project to show the increasing salience of
immigration in the national contexts since the mid-1970s and how international
dynamics like globalization and Europeanization of the agenda might have contributed
to the radicalization and convergence of mainstream parties’ policy positions on the
issue, although with different intensity. Givens and Luedtke (2005), as well as Hinnfors
and colleagues (2012) found similar results analysing the evolution of immigration pol-
icies in the European context. They show how mainstream right, but also left-wing
parties, gradually move towards equally restrictive policy preferences and that this
process started several years ago.
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Dynamics of convergence towards more restrictive positions on immigration, similar to
the one documented for parties and policymakers have been found in European public
opinion. In a comparative study on attitudes towards immigration in Europe, Sprague-
Jones (2011) shows how the rise and the magnitude of radical right parties might be
able to shape people’s views on the issue. Along with that, other country-case studies
have highlighted the evolution of public attitudes towards immigration that, with
different intensity, has shifted towards more restrictive stances. These studies show that
respondents’ attitudes towards crime, asylum/immigration and the risk of terrorism
have been often unified into the immigration/integration divide (Clarke et al., 2009;
Odmalm & Bale, 2015). Besides the already mentioned exogenous and endogenous
factors that of course influenced not only policymakers’ but also citizens and voters’
behaviour, other elements could have favoured the spread of negative attitudes in the
electorate. The increased politicization of the issue triggered media attention as well as
general concern about immigration among voters (Morales et al., 2015). A number of
studies show that the salience of immigration issues in the media might be able to
shape people’s attitudes (Boomgaarden & Vlieghenthart, 2009; De Vreese & Boomgaarden,
2006), and that these issues are attractive for the media (Brighton & Foy, 2007).
Figure 1. Attitudes towards immigration in the European Union. Note: The question was as follows: ‘For
each of the following statements, please tell me to what degree you agree or disagree with each state-
ment: […] Q67: Immigration to [country] should be decreased significantly’.
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With 74.3 per cent of respondents in favour of more restrictive immigration policies,
survey data presented in Figure 1 show how skewed EU public opinion appears on this
issue. However, responses to the question have been dichotomized, excluding ‘neither
agree nor disagree’ responses, don’t knows and refusals. Therefore, agrees include respon-
dents strongly agreeing and agreeing with a restriction of immigration, while disagrees
comprise strongly disagree and disagree responses to the question. While the distribution
presented above seems to be closer to Stokes’ definition of valence issue, indicating a
quite consistent degree of agreement among the electorate, the debate is still open.
Stokes (1992) himself does not explicitly assume that voters should unanimously agree
on candidate or party valences to treat such issues as valence issues. Moreover, as stressed
by Odmalm and Bale (2015) simply knowing what the electorate thinks about immigration
does not allow us to fully account for either the positions the parties adopt or for when the
issue is (or is no) emphasized by parties. However, they also recognize the growing empiri-
cal evidence about a gradual convergence of mainstream parties towards more restrictive
positions that, combined with the general consensus among EU voters on the direction
that such policies should take, might push scholars to reconsider immigration as a
(quasi-)valence question (Green, 2007).
It is important to stress that the valence nature of immigration is of course not a perfect
one. It has been traditionally conceived as a positional issue, i.e. a value that was not
shared by the entire electorate, given that some voters may not be against more permiss-
ive immigration policies. Nonetheless, its growing unpopularity across the broad ideologi-
cal spectrum gives immigration nowadays some of the characteristics of valence issues,
and it is most likely that political parties shift their positions regarding immigration and
integration issues (Akkerman, 2015). The increasing saliency of the issue in the last
decades and its effects on European party systems and voters’ opinion suggest the possi-
bility to treat immigration as a policy vote-winning strategy with ‘quasi-valence’ attributes.
Although economy is considered a valence issue par excellence, several other issues might
be able to ‘coagulate’ large majorities of voters on specific policy outcomes. In an increas-
ingly globalized and interconnected world, in which traditional national boundaries fade
away and the free movement of people is considered a cornerstone of political entities
such as the European Union, the assessment of electoral accountability necessarily
implies to consider other salient aspects of policy-making, like immigration. According
to Donald Stokes, risks of biased conceptualization might arise from any a priori classifi-
cation of position- or valence-issues, that should be instead ‘a matter to be settled empiri-
cally’ (Stokes, 1963, p. 373). Recent research explicitly tackles this problem, considering
political issues as placed along one single dimension in which positional and valence rep-
resent the extremes of the same continuum (De Sio & Weber, 2014; D’Alimonte et al., 2019).
In particular circumstances – that sometimes evolve into real ‘critical junctures’ – a pos-
itional issue may assume the characteristics of valence or, on the contrary, a valence
issue may configure itself as a positional one, ideally moving along a continuum. In this
perspective, a traditionally positional issue such as immigration might be conceived as
(quasi-)valence when it turns out to be less divisive. It happens when a considerable
majority of people considers desirable a particular policy outcome and parties gradually
converge on those positions. However, this evolution does not imply a permanent trans-
formation of immigration from positional to valence issue but, rather, a temporary shift
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triggered by specific circumstances. These considerations lead therefore to the expec-
tation that perceived levels of immigration have a strong effect on vote choice:
H1: Perceived lower levels of immigration make voters more inclined to vote for the incum-
bent government (i.e. “Immigration performance voting hypothesis”)
2.1. Contingency effects on immigration performance voting
Research on retrospective performance voting shows that the accountability mechanism is
likely tobemediatedby individual- aswell as country-level characteristics (Duch& Stevenson,
2008; Vander Brug et al., 2007). The first factor that is expecting tomoderate immigration per-
formance voting is partisanship. Research stresses its potential effect on evaluations and per-
ceptions of politics and voting behaviour (Evans & Andersen, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2007;
Vivyan et al., 2012). In the framework of immigration performance voting I expect that
whether satisfied or dissatisfied with the way in which the incumbent government
managed immigration, partisan voters are less likely to switch their preference according
to short-term factors such as retrospective judgments (De Vries & Giger, 2013). Voters with
weak party identification are expected to rely much more on their retrospective evaluations
on immigration than citizens with strong partisan attachment. For this reason, the first sub-
hypothesis testswhether immigrationperformance voting is stronger for non-partisanvoters:
H1a: The influence of immigration evaluations on incumbent vote intention is higher for non-
partisans than for voters belonging to a party (i.e. “Partisanship hypothesis”).
Moving to the ‘contextual’ factors that are expected to moderate electoral accountabil-
ity, the analysis considers how the clarity of government responsibility moderates immigra-
tion performance voting. Research shows how the strength of the link between economic
government performance and electoral outcome is heavily influenced by the clarity of pol-
itical responsibility (Hobolt et al., 2013; Schwindt-Bayer & Tavits, 2016; Van der Brug et al.,
2007) and, in particular, by the specific characteristics of the government in office. The
present article aims to test these assumptions with reference to specific features of the gov-
ernment composition. When voters deal with single-party (or even compact coalition) gov-
ernments that are stable along the legislature and cancountona clearmajority inparliament,
they inevitably find easier to assign responsibility for political decisions. This contextual
feature turns out to be also relevant in the case of immigration performance voting. In a
growing globalized system, as in the case of the European Union, the decision-making
process is often shared between different levels of governance. In this situation, voters
might consider national governments less responsible for decisions taken on this issue
and consider them ‘mere executors’ of a ‘supranational will’. However, survey data suggest
that citizens seem to consider national governments more responsible than the EU on this
issue, in the sameway, they consider them responsible for the national economic conditions1
(Hobolt & Tilley, 2014). Therefore, in political contextswhere the composition and the charac-
teristics of the national government make it easier for voters to identify the parties that are
responsible for political decisions, the effect of immigration perceptions on vote choice is
expected to be stronger. These considerations lead to the second sub-hypothesis:
H1b: The influence of immigration evaluations on incumbent vote intention is higher in con-
texts characterized by higher clarity of responsibility (i.e. “Contextual hypothesis”)
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2.2. Party competence and immigration: A second dimension for the valence
model?
In their studies on Canadian elections, Bélanger and Nadeau (2014, 2015) have recently
enlarged the scope of the valence model of economic voting to the perceived compe-
tence of government at dealing with specific issues. Governing parties’ performance
and competence, they suggest, should represent the components of an ‘integrated’
incumbent vote model. However, the literature on the valence framework traditionally
neglected the potential role of party competence on vote choice, focusing almost exclu-
sively on the impact of retrospective performance evaluations. Only recently, the joint
effect of retrospective evaluations and issue ownership on voting behaviour has been
tested (Bélanger & Gélineau, 2010; Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Bélanger & Nadeau, 2014,
2015; Plescia & Kritzinger, 2017; van der Brug, 2017). These studies mainly refer to the
‘competence’ dimension of issue ownership, namely party’s perceived ability at handling
problems of concern to voters2 (Petrocik, 1996). The literature on issue ownership illus-
trates how perceptions of party competence on key issues might influence electoral
behaviour: people form their preferences by comparing party utilities and supporting
those (governing or opposition) parties with the highest expected utility (Bélanger &
Meguid, 2008; Clarke et al., 2009; Lachat, 2014). This expected utility derives from the per-
ceived competence on an issue that is salient at a given time, therefore parties will try to
gain electoral consensus presenting themselves as the most competent.
Over the last few decades, questions related to immigration, immigrant workers, and
asylum seekers have become increasingly contested issues among public opinion but
also at party level (Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015). The literature on the saliency of immigra-
tion identifies the growth of immigrant population and its composition one of the main
drivers of its politicization (Grande et al., 2019; Green-Pedersen & Otjes, 2017). The salience
of an issue, in fact, relies on two preconditions (Lavine et al., 2000), i.e. accessibility and
importance. The first depends on the availability of information on the issue, while the
second depends on the expected impact of the issue on individuals’ well-being. In the
last decade immigration-related issues have constantly gained room in news media and
information in general with the documented effect of defining the boundaries of public
debate over the issue (Boomgaarden & Vlieghenthart, 2009; McLaren et al., 2017). More-
over, immigration as an issue has the potential to cut across several policy areas, involving
economic and cultural dimensions (Odmalm & Bale, 2015). The high levels of labour
migration from the poorer regions of Europe, as well as the recent wave of immigrants,
refugees and asylum seekers from poorer and unstable African and Asian countries
have been increasingly perceived as a ‘threat’ to several aspects of European life. The per-
ceived potential impact on traditional culture, public services and crime has consolidated
immigration as one of the most topical and pressing political issues in Europe.
Recalling Stokes’ classification of positional and valence issues, Green and Jennings
(2017) underline that ‘issues become about competence when the politics of the time
makes them so’, i.e. that the politicization of an issue will lead parties and public
opinion to focus more on management, delivery and competence. The sharp increase
in the salience of immigration since the early 2000s suggests therefore that voters’ con-
siderations about party competence constitute a relevant factor for the evaluation of gov-
ernment performance. The concept of competence, in fact, seems to be well connected
146 A. FUMAROLA
with Stokes’ conceptualization of valence issues, defined as ‘performance issues’ that are
generally ‘positively or negatively valued by the electorate’ (Stokes, 1963, p. 373). In this
perspective, I expect that citizens would cast their vote not only on the basis of their retro-
spective evaluations of immigration but also because of government (perceived) compe-
tence at handling the issue. Voters can use their retrospective evaluations of immigration
as an information shortcut, and the strength of the effect might depends on the extent to
which people are concerned with the issue. These considerations lead to the last two,
interconnected, hypotheses:
H2: Immigration performance voting is stronger for voters considering immigration a salient
issue (i.e. “Saliency hypothesis”)
H3: When voters consider immigration a salient issue, immigration evaluations have greater
positive effect on vote intention if a government party is perceived as the issue owner (i.e.
“Competence hypothesis”)
3. Data and methods
To test the theoretical propositions, I employ individual-level data from the 7th round of
the EES Voter Study (Van Egmond et al., 2013). It is a cross-national survey collected
immediately after the 2009 European Parliament elections in 27 EU Member States. The
sample size for each country consists of roughly 1000 respondents, making the total
sample composed of 27,069 respondents. However, because of the listwise deletion
used to remove don’t knows, refusals, respondents who said they would not vote,
would spoil the vote or vote blank, and missing responses, the final sample consists of
15,259 observations. The special battery of questions administered in several European
Member States during the same period allows to analyse the effect of individual percep-
tions of immigration on voting behaviour. This peculiarity makes it the most complete
comparative survey to study the phenomenon under investigation.3
3.1. Dependent variable
At the individual-level a measure of national vote intention is used as dependent variable4:
“If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote?”.
Responses to this item are dichotomized (0-1), distinguishing between individuals who
would vote for an opposition party (0) and respondents who would vote for a government
party (1). Government party voters represent 44.2 per cent of the respondents, while oppo-
sition party voters represent 55.8 per cent of the respondents.
3.2. Independent and moderating variables
At the individual level, the key explanatory variable is a measure of immigration evaluation
and is based on the following survey item:
“And over the last 12 months, has immigration in [COUNTRY] increased a lot, increased a little,
stayed the same, decreased a little or decreased a lot?”.
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The original variable is recoded as having values ranging from −1 (‘Increased a lot/
Increased a little’) to 1 (‘Decreased a lot/ Decreased a little’) with the medium value 0
(‘Stayed the same’). The decision to use this question follows the same logic traditionally
employed in adopted on retrospective voting. According to the influential study of Duch
and Stevenson on retrospective voting (2008, p. 46), ‘the key elements of this question are
that it is retrospective, it refers to the state of the [issue], and it concerns change rather
than its absolute level’. Analysing the immigration issue in the framework of the
valence model thus implies the use of peculiar measures. The selected independent vari-
able allows, in fact, to capture retrospective assessments of the change in the immigration
level, assuming its reduction as the shared policy goal.
To test the moderating effect of partisanship on immigration performance voting, i.e. if
non-partisans rely more on their retrospective evaluations than those who feel close to a
party, I use the following question:
“Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party? If so, which party do you feel close
to?”
Responses to the question are coded assigning ‘zero’ (0) to those who don’t feel close to
any party and ‘one’ (1) to those who feel close to any opposition or government party.
I also test the moderating effect of the political context, in particular the government
clarity of responsibility, using an additive index derived from Bengtsson (2004) that exclu-
sively focuses on the dispersion of power within the current government. It is based on
three important features of government status, i.e. ‘parliamentary support for the govern-
ment’ (minority or majority support); ‘diversion of power’ (coalition or single-party govern-
ment); ‘government stability’ (less than or two/more years in power). One point is assigned
to each aspect considered ‘clear’ while zero points are assigned to each aspect classified
‘not clear’.5 Values for each aspect are then summarized. Consequently, countries are
coded as having values between 0 (low clarity) and 3 (high clarity).
To test the saliency of immigration in the EU countries and its moderating effect on per-
formance voting, a measure based on the traditional MIP (‘most important problem’)
open-ended question is included:
“What do you think is the most important problem facing [COUNTRY] today?”
Responses to the question are dichotomized (0-1), distinguishing between voters who
indicated issues strictly related to immigration – such as national immigration policy,
asylum seekers, refugees, xenophobia, migrant workers – to be the most important
problem (1) and voters who indicated another issue as the most important problem (0).
Moreover, this question is strictly related to the second key independent variable, i.e.
party competence as measured by the following item:
“Which political party do you think would be best at dealing with [MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM]?”
In turn, answers are coded as for the main independent variable, ranging from −1 to 1:
government party as the most competent (1); opposition party as the most competent
(−1); none are competent (0). Since we are interested in the effect of competence at
dealing with immigration, only those respondents who indicate immigration issues as
the most important problem are included to test the last hypothesis (H3). For this
reason, the sample analysed in the last model consists of 4049 observations.6
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3.3. Control variables
Finally, variables usually employed as individual controls in analyses on voting behaviour –
social class (on a five-point scale), gender (dummy) and age (in full years) – integrated by a
traditional measure of sociotropic evaluation of the economy as control for economic
voting are included (Nadeau et al., 2012). The original five-point scale to measure
responses to this questions has been inverted and recoded as ranging from −1 (‘a little
worse/ a lot worse’) to 1 (‘a little better/ a lot better’) with 0 as medium value (‘stayed
the same’). Apart from individual economic perceptions, the socio-demographic controls
will not be discussed in the results given that they are not the principal focus of the
present study.
3.4. Methodology
Given the structure of data collected at the micro and macro level and the binary nature of
the dependent variable, I employ Multilevel Logistic Regression Models (MLRM) to esti-
mate different effects among variables with random intercepts accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity among countries7 (Gelman & Hill, 2007). Individual respondents (level 1) are,
in fact, nested into countries (level 2) that have different sets of parameters for the random
factors, allowing intercepts to vary by nation. Several tests to assess the reliability of the
findings are presented and provided in the Supplementary Material.
4. Results
Table 1 presents hierarchical logistic regression models (Models 1–5) in which the hypoth-
eses are tested. All the models predict vote intention in relation to individual evaluations of
immigration. Model 1 tests the direct effect of immigration evaluations on vote choice in
the 27 EU countries (‘Immigration performance voting hypothesis’). The second model
presents the interaction effect of partisanship on performance voting (‘Partisanship
hypothesis’), while the third model tests the conditional effect of clarity of responsibility
(‘Contextual hypothesis’). Model 4 examines the moderating effect of issue salience (‘Sal-
iency hypothesis’) is tested, while Model 5 finally analyses the conditional effect of party
competence on immigration performance voting (‘Competence hypothesis’).
We start by analysing whether voters rely on immigration when they form electoral pre-
ferences. Model 1 presents the results. In line with the main hypothesis, retrospective
evaluations have a positive and statistically significant effect on incumbent vote intention.
People that perceive levels of immigration in their country decreasing are more likely to
vote for governing parties. An increase by one unit in the level of immigration perceptions,
increases the probability of vote for the incumbent by ∼9.2 percentage points. Compared
with the coefficient of economic perceptions, immigration evaluations show an equally
decisive on voters’ choice: a one-unit change in economic perceptions decreases the prob-
ability to vote for incumbent parties by ∼8.7 percentage points.
Moving to the individual- and country-level factors that might affect immigration per-
formance voting, Model 2 tests the interaction effect of party affiliation on the accountabil-
ity link. The negative and statistically significant coefficient, along with the marginal effect
presented in Figure 2, corroborates sub-hypothesis H1a.
EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 149
Table 1. Multilevel logistic regression models of incumbent vote intention.
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Immigration evaluation 0.463*** (0.024) 0.641***(0.045) 0.105 (0.074) 0.246*** (0.029) 0.721*** (0.060)
Issue ownership 1.500*** (0.058)
MODERATING VARIABLES
Partisanship 0.219*** (0.041) 0.194*** (0.041) 0.221*** (0.041) 0.251*** (0.041) 0.379*** (0.100)
Clarity of responsibility −0.515 (0.293)
Issue salience −0.607*** (0.046)
INTERACTION TERMS
Immigration evaluation * Partisanship −0.250*** (0.053)
Immigration evaluation * Clarity 0.192*** (0.038)
Immigration evaluation * Salience 0.575*** (0.056)
Immigration evaluation * Ownership −0.040 (0.069)
CONTROLS
Social class 0.115*** (0.018) 0.116*** (0.018) 0.113*** (0.018) 0.116*** (0.018) 0.106* (0.043)
Age 0.008*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) −0.005* (0.002)
Gender −0.085* (0.036) −0.083* (0.036) −0.080* (0.036) −0.079* (0.036) 0.095 (0.096)
Economic evaluations 0.451*** (0.031) 0.451*** (0.031) 0.447*** (0.031) 0.459*** (0.031) 0.360*** (0.070)
Constant −0.771*** (0.227) −0.756*** (0.228) 0.197 (0.593) −0.606* (0.235) −1.350*** (0.246)
Variance (countries) 1.193 1.196 1.058 1.288 0.487
N: countries 27 27 27 27 27
N: individuals 15,330 15,330 15,330 15,330 4,049
Log Likelihood −9,273.3 −9,262.2 −9,258.6 −9,079.5 −1747.4
Akaike information criterion (AIC) 18,562.6 18,542.4 18,537.3 18,179.0 3514.8
Notes: Dependent variable: National vote intention for incumbent government parties (0-1).








Immigration perceptions, in fact, reveal a stronger effect on vote intention for non-par-
tisan voters. For these respondents, a one-unit increase in the level of perceived immigra-
tion evaluations reduces the probability to vote for the incumbent from 41.6 to 29.9 per
cent. On the other hand, immigration evaluations seem to hardly impact partisans’ vote
choice, as the likelihood of voting for the incumbent merely decreases of less than 8 per-
centage points.
A second moderating factor is the clarity of responsibility of the current government.
Results in Model 3 confirm the third hypothesis: the positive and statistically significant
effect (at the 0.001 level) suggests that in countries where the assignment of responsibility
is made easier by the configuration of the government – in terms of stability, parliamen-
tary support and ideological cohesion – voters can effectively sanction (or reward) govern-
ments for bad (or good) management of immigration as derived by their evaluation.
The plot in Figure 3 presents the predicted probability of incumbent vote intention for
different levels of clarity of responsibility. If immigration evaluations decrease by one unit
in contexts where government clarity is high (e.g. United Kingdom or Hungary), the prob-
ability to vote for the incumbent declines by ∼13.2 percentage points. This effect is almost
three times smaller in EU member States where clarity is low (e.g. Belgium or Latvia). Here,
a deterioration by one unit in immigration perceptions decreases the likelihood of incum-
bent voting by ∼5.9 percentage points.
Model 4 seeks to test whether immigration performance voting is stronger for those
voters considering immigration a salient issue. The positive coefficient, significant at the
0.001 level, encourages to accept the second hypothesis (Figure 4).
For these respondents, bad evaluations about government’s job decrease the likelihood
to vote for the incumbent by ∼13.3 percentage points. Conversely, for those voters who do
Figure 2. Effect of evaluations of immigration evaluations on incumbent vote intention depending on
the level of partisanship. Note: Predicted probability of incumbent vote intention by performance
evaluation for non-partisan and partisan voters. All estimates and the 95 per cent confidence interval
are based on Model 2, Table 1.
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Figure 4. Effect of evaluations of immigration evaluations on incumbent vote intention depending on
the level of issue salience. Note: Predicted probability of incumbent vote intention by performance
evaluation for voters’ perceived level of issue salience. All estimates and the 95 per cent confidence
interval are based on Model 4, Table 1.
Figure 3. Effect of evaluations of immigration evaluations on incumbent vote intention depending on
the level of government clarity of responsibility. Note: Predicted probability of incumbent vote inten-
tion by performance evaluation for different levels of government clarity of responsibility. All estimates
and the 95 per cent confidence interval are based on Model 3, Table 1.
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not consider immigration a priority in the national agenda, the effect is approximately
three times smaller (∼4.7 percentage points).
Finally, Model 5 tests the effect of party competence discussed in the third section.
Because of the link between ‘salience’ and ‘ownership’ questions (the latter asks which
is the best party at dealing with the ‘most important problem’ stated in the former), the
sample is subset in order to include only those respondents considering immigration
the most important problem. In this way, the new sample, representative of all the 27
EU member States, counts approximately 4000 respondents. Finally, an interaction term
between immigration evaluations and issue ownership is included to analyse the effect
of party competence on performance immigration voting.
Figure 5 represents thepredictedprobability of incumbentvote intention fordifferent levels
of issue ownership. The almost flat lines confirm the coefficient reported in Table 1. The inter-
action term, in fact, fails to reach the statistical significance, leading to the rejection of H3.
These findings, therefore, discourage any claim about a potential conditional effect of
issue ownership on performance voting suggested by recent research on economic voting
and issue ownership. However, the existence of a double, but independent and direct effect
of immigration evaluations and issue ownership on incumbent vote intention cannot be
excluded. While this assumption is supported by previous studies (cf. Bélanger & Nadeau,
2014; Martinsson, 2009), it seems to find only a very partial confirmation in the present
findings with the two variables holding a strong and significant direct effect on the depen-
dent variable. Moreover, the mutual independence of the two variables shown by the inter-
action coefficient is confirmed also by the very low correlation coefficient (r =0.16).
Figure 5. Effect of evaluations of immigration evaluations on incumbent vote intention depending on
the level of issue ownership. Note: Predicted probability of incumbent vote intention by performance
evaluation for voters’ perceived level of issue ownership. All estimates and the 95 per cent confidence
interval are based on Model.
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5. Discussion and conclusion
Scholars define the current political age an ‘era of valence politics’ (Bale, 2006), where
voters are expected to structure their choices primarily on the basis of their evaluations
about the competence of governing parties to deliver policy outcomes. Although the
immigration issue is ‘of course ideologically loaded’ (Odmalm & Bale, 2015, p. 366),
there is evidence of its transition to a different connotation that has contributed to
reshape the traditional valence issue agenda that structured party competition in
Europe in the last decades (Clarke et al., 2009). Three factors are considered relevant to
activate this process of transformation (Clarke et al., 2009; Green, 2007): the significance
of government performance for vote choice, a decline in the association between left–
right position and vote choice, and the perceived convergence of mainstream parties. Evi-
dence about this process, characterizing European politics in the last decades, has been
well described in the literature on issue competition and immigration (Alonso &
Fonseca, 2011; Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015). In particular, increasing consensus on tra-
ditionally left–right issues, such as immigration, has important implications for party com-
petition. ‘Public opinion […] matters. If it moves, so will parties after a time lag.’ (Morales
et al., 2015, p. 479). The necessity to study the consequences of this process motivated the
analysis of electoral dynamics linked to the immigration issue through the lens of the
valence model.
Do voters hold governments accountable for higher levels of immigration? This article
provides evidence regarding immigration performance voting across EU Member States.
Consistent with research on retrospective voting, the analysis confirmed that voters
may sanction incumbents if they (indirectly) judge immigration policy performance on
immigration unsatisfactory or ineffective for reaching the desired goal. Moreover, the
magnitude of this effect resembles that found in the economic voting literature.
The strength of the immigration performance voting shows to be conditional to specific
individual- and country-level factors. Non-partisan voters put greater weight on these elec-
toral ‘shortcuts’, using perceptions on immigration as one of the main tools to structure
their preferences. These findings have two important implications. First of all, it supports
the idea concerning the transformation of immigration into a (quasi-)valence issue. The
increased salient and cross-cutting connotation assumed by this issue in the last
decades (Odmalm & Bale, 2015) make it no more exclusively identified with right-wing
party platforms but, rather, involves a diffuse convergence of mainstream political
parties in a number of European countries (Alonso & Fonseca, 2011; Mudde, 2004).
There is, in fact, diffused evidence about the popularity and the widespread support
gained by anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic platforms among opposition but also govern-
ing parties – and voters – throughout the European Union (Meguid, 2005).
The comparative nature of the EES survey data allows also to analyse immigration per-
formance voting across institutional contexts. The analysis confirms the impact of govern-
ment clarity of responsibility in the 27 EU Member States. This result not only confirms that
cohesive and stable executives make voters able to identify who is responsible for policy
decisions concerning immigration. It also confirms that voters still consider EU national
governments responsible for immigration even in a phase of general ‘Europeanization’
of national policies and in a context characterized by complex multilevel governance.
The increasing level of immigrants and refugees, in particular after the 2015 crisis, has
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negatively affected citizens’ attitudes boosting disaffection towards the EU institutions
much more than towards national governments and parliaments. However, the present
findings are in line with recent research showing that the growing Euroscepticism did
not impact citizens’ ability to differentiate responsibility of the different levels of govern-
ment and attribute blame accordingly, especially when the immigration issue rises in sal-
iency (Harteveld et al., 2018; Wilson & Hobolt, 2015). This tendency might be caused by the
fact that harmonization is more difficult in policy areas like immigration that are highly
politicized at the national level so that, aside from a certain level of harmonization in
cross-border police and judicial affairs, the prevailing tendency in the EU Member
States has been for the primacy of intergovernmentalism rather than supranationalism
(Bickerton et al., 2015).
In line with studies on retrospective voting and issue salience (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008;
Ecker et al., 2015; Singer, 2011), the present analysis also shows that voters rely more on
performance voting when immigration becomes a salient issue. The saliency of an issue is
not stable across time and countries, but it could vary according to its visibility and impor-
tance (Zaller, 1992). Situations in which the control of immigration or the allocation of
asylum seekers turns out to be a pressing issue, allow the reshaping of citizens’ agenda
of priorities. In periods in which citizens perceive a dramatic increase in immigration
levels, they might feel unsecure regarding their personal or economic situation, so they
could use personal evaluations as shortcuts to decide government’s fate at elections.
Periods of crisis, in particular, magnify such dynamics, strengthening the accountability
link between performance and vote but also providing a window of opportunity for oppo-
sition parties that make containment of immigration their own. If ‘citizens discriminate in
their evaluations of the incumbent, placing the most importance on issues that are actually
important’ (Singer, 2011, p. 304), governments will adapt their policy agenda on the basis
of salient issues people pay attention to at a given time. Such considerations may
indirectly provide insights on the recent electoral dynamics common to several European
countries.
The concept of issue salience is strictly connected to the one of issue ownership,
since the influence of the latter on vote choice is conditional upon the perceived sal-
ience of the issue (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008). In this case, results do not support the
existence of a conditional effect of party competence on immigration performance
voting, even though they could open up perspectives on the role of issue ownership.
The analysis highlights the potential direct, independent, or simultaneous, effect on
incumbent vote intention resembling the mechanism that Bélanger and Nadeau
(2015) found in their study on Canada or Plescia and Kritzinger (2017) in Austria. Accord-
ing to this research, the perceived party competence would work in parallel to citizens’
evaluation of government performance on immigration, with the potential effect of
reinforcing or counterbalancing each other depending on the nature of these evalu-
ations (positive/negative) and the owner of the issue (government/opposition). While
results seem to support the prominence of performance evaluations on vote intention,
further research should focus more on these two distinct components of the valence
model and their potential alternative effect to address cross-national variation in elec-
toral accountability.
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Notes
1. Both economy and immigration score a mean of 7.25 on the 0–10 scale of national govern-
ment responsibility for the public. Only healthcare scores a higher mean of 7.91. Calculations
are based on data from the 2009 EES Voter Study (Van Egmond et al., 2013).
2. The decision to analyse the ‘competence’ component of issue ownership – rather than the
‘associative’ one – should relieve potential concerns about the endogeneity with the depen-
dent variable measuring vote intention. Although Walgrave et al. (2015) suggest that people’s
perceptions of competence issue ownership are formed not only by their partisanship but also
by parties’ past performance on that issue, they recognize – in line with previous research on
performance voting – that it may be the opposite in presence of salient issues. In this case
voters’ preferences would ‘be determined by parties’ performance on the issues they care
about and devote attention to. For minor issues, it may be just the opposite’. (Walgrave
et al., 2015, p. 787). Given that in the empirical analysis (cf. Model 5, Table 1) I test the con-
ditional effect of issue ownership in combination with issue salience, any potential bias in
the estimates should be minimized. Finally, the correlation test between issue ownership
and partisanship suggests their mutual independence (r = 0.30).
3. The fact that the 7th round of the EES Voter Study was conducted before the breakthrough of
the so-called ‘migration crisis’ in 2014–2015 should not represent a limit for the generalization
of the findings for two reasons. First, it was conducted after the onset of the economic crisis
that contributed to the spread of anti-migrant sentiment and discrimination especially
towards foreign workers. Already in 2009–2010 survey data reported that 72 percent of
respondents believed that ‘employers should give jobs to nationals over immigrants when
jobs are scarce’(Seguino, 2010, p. 184). Moreover, the opportunity to test the likelihood of
voting according to individual perceptions of immigration in this phase might also represents
a point of strength for the present research. Controlling for potential biases deriving from the
spread of the migration crisis such as the intensive news media coverage (Atwell Seate &
Mastro, 2016) among others, should help to estimate the performance voting effect more
clearly and make the findings more robust.
4. Vote intention in national elections (also called ‘hypothetical vote’) is traditionally used as the
dependent variable in studies of retrospective performance voting (see e.g. Nadeau et al.,
2012; Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Hobolt et al., 2013; Talving, 2018).
5. For more details, see variable description and Table A.3. in the Supplementary Material.
6. However, as Table A.2. in the Supplementary Material shows, even with such a large drop of
observations the sample is still representative of all the 27 EU member States.
7. Analysis reported here is carried out using R-studio version 1.0.153 and the glmer function to
fit logistic mixed-effects models with a random effect for the countries (Bates et al., 2015).
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